Representatives of the Indian National Congress of the Muslim League and the Sikh community arrived with Lord Mountbatten on the so-called Plan of June 3 or Mountbatten`s Plan. This plan was the last plan for independence. 13 The conflict between Congress and the Political Department has been very long. Each interpreted the 1946 memorandum as perceived in his own interest: for Corfield, the States were, like Supreme Cycy, obsolete, on the path to independence, from which they could not, but only if they had chosen, freely enter into negotiations for a “political agreement” with the Indian government; For Nehru, the independence of the states and the disruption of the country as an “anarchy through the back door” and therefore impossible, the possibility of not having a “political agreement” was not open. The logic of this has led to the freedom of states to establish contacts as they wished – with the Constituent Assembly, if they wished to be admitted to the Union, with individual government bodies on administrative relations and with the Department of Foreign Affairs, if they were to be independent states (the long Corfield memo of 27 March 1947, R/3/1/136). The logic of the other led to the creation of a new Ministry of State, which would close all options for accession by imposing adherence to the three themes (Nehru to the Viceroy, 26 May, R/3/1/136 and 4 June, R/3/1/137). The Indian office was fidgeting between a number of points somewhere in between. Corfield`s efforts and some office resistances are well represented in L/P-S/13/1831. An important turning point in the fight for the viceroy`s support was the viceroy`s 18th meeting on 13 June (R/3/1/137), when Nehru threw Corfield in the face for “lack of talent” and called for an immediate high-level judicial inquiry. It was decided to create a Ministry of State. The ministry`s negotiations with the States are mentioned in r/1/30/39 and R/1/30/40 and are the subject of Menon`s book (Integration of Indian States). James Manor pointed out that “since the void created by the destocking of one higher power necessarily had to be filled by another,” it can be said that “the afterlife has been transmitted and it is inevitable that it will be transmitted.” (Manor, `The Deise of the Princely Order: A Reassessment`, in Jeffrey, R.
(Ed.), People, Princes and Paramount Power (1970) Google Scholar, and in a personal communication.) With regard to the relative powers and capabilities of the Delhi government and state leaders, there is clearly a great deal of validity in this view. But the evolution of the inevitable history is not always as fluid as this formulation seems to be. Nor do I suggest that the strength of the thoughts and actions of the rearguard be underestimated. This is especially true for timing – and timing can be crucial. In this regard, Manor made it clear (note 50) that his discussion should relate “primarily to states other than Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir”.” Views recorded on Cambridge Core between September 2016 and December 10, 2020. This data is updated every 24 hours. 64 I would like to clarify the points related to it. Of course, I recognize that Congress and the League were not looking for common bodies, that there was a legacy of mistrust between them that had to be overcome, and to that mistrust would soon be added the bitterness caused by the human cost of division, and at the same time, I must emphasize Mountbat`s potential for influence during the months of June and July. This did not extend to a common Governor General (but perhaps it was a sign of Pakistan`s distrust of Mountbatten?), but it could have created the humble groups of experts that I suggested. I also think that they would have survived the throes of division if the Kashmir issue had not aggravated it so deeply (not on a human level, but politically).